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“Our attitude towards pleading formalities will be largely determined by what we
expect of the pleadings.”
–Hon. Charles E. Clark1

INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, at a conference held at Northeastern University
School of Law marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
†
1

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456 (1943).
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Procedure, pleading was invoked more often as a model of the Rules’
commitment to merits adjudication than as a problem to be solved.2 Although
participants adverted to an ongoing debate about whether more should be
demanded of pleadings, they mostly worried about the effect of other
procedural reforms on access to justice.3 After all, there were many recent
reforms to debate: amendments to Rule 11, restrictions on class actions, the
Supreme Court’s Rule 56 trilogy, limitations on discovery, and tightened
standing requirements.4 But when it came to pleading, participants took as a
given the liberal notice pleading regime established by Conley v. Gibson,5
even as they recognized that some lower courts had experimented with nontrans-substantive pleading regimes for particular categories of cases.6
For the balance of the last quarter century, the conference participants’
overall optimism about the state of pleading would prove sensible. Thrice
the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of notice pleading and the
illegitimacy of attempts to alter the pleading standards outside of the
rulemaking process.7 Most lower courts that had flirted with heightened
pleading standards for specific categories of cases eventually beat a retreat,
if not a hasty one.8
Yet, with the announcement of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly9 and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal,10 the Supreme Court changed what courts expect of notice pleading.
Whether one calls it “the new summary judgment motion,”11 “new” or
“heightened” pleading,12 or (as I will use throughout this paper) plausibility
pleading, the burdens of pleading have changed. Many scholars have already
2 See generally Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938–
1988, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1874 (1989).
3 See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers
to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1902-03, 1906 (1989) (discussing developments in
subject matter jurisdiction, fee-shifting, and standing doctrines).
4 Id. at 1913-18 (discussing reforms).
5 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
6 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2105-07
(1989) (noting that, “in recent decades, lower federal courts appear to have entertained Rule 12
motions with increasing frequency, especially in a few substantive classes of cases”); Weinstein,
supra note 3, at 1914 (discussing pleading rules for “specialized kinds of cases”).
7 See infra note 29.
8 See infra note 22.
9 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
10 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
11 Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and
Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 28-34 (2010) (discussing similarities between
plausibility pleading and summary judgment).
12 See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING
THE FEDERAL C OURTHOUSE DOORS? 4-5 (2013) (adopting the term “New Pleading”).
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written about the burden plausibility pleading imposes upon claimants.13 As
most commentators have argued, the introduction of plausibility pleading is
congruent with many other restrictions on courthouse access that have
emerged over the past fifty years.14 In this Article, I do not focus on the
pleading burden as it is received by and applied against claimants, nor do I
make additional arguments that plausibility pleading limits access to the
courthouse. Instead, I argue that the burden of plausibility pleading also
falls on judges, and that judges are poorly situated to shoulder that burden—
especially when one considers how restrictions on courthouse access and
other changes have reshaped the nature of litigation in the federal courts.
To preview my argument briefly, plausibility pleading formally asks
judges—for the first time since the advent of the Federal Rules—to engage
in a merits-based analysis at the pleading stage based on their “judicial
experience and common sense.”15 Judges are expected to engage in this
inquiry with only the factual allegations in the complaint at their disposal.
Putting aside the difficulty of conducting this analysis under the best of
circumstances, our federal judges have extremely limited judicial experience
to apply to merits-based decisions. The number of trials, the ultimate
arbiter of merit, has fallen precipitously in the past fifty years.16 Trials have
been replaced by settlements (the terms of which are often secret, even to
the judge handling the case), alternative dispute resolution (with outcomes
that judges may review only for arbitrariness, if they review them at all),
and summary judgment (a poor substitute for trial).17 With these gaps in
judicial experience, a judge is left to compensate with “common sense,”
relying on heuristics that may interfere with accurate decisionmaking.18
This argument is not made to denigrate federal judges but rather to
identify the impoverished landscape of actual merits-based determinations
upon which federal courts can draw to assess the plausibility of new claims.
Moreover, the argument should be familiar to even casual readers of Twombly;
13 See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 1-2 (2012) (reviewing the breadth of literature on the topic).
14 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 309-10 (2013)
(introducing an analysis of pleading changes in the context of other procedural “stop signs” erected
during the past twenty-five years); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and
for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 105 (2008) (listing
changes in pleading rules as one example of many changes that have made it harder for plaintiffs
to access the courts).
15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
16 See infra subsection II.A.1.
17 See infra subsection II.A.2–II.A.5.
18 See infra Section II.B.
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there, the Court determined that judges were incapable of managing discovery
given their limited knowledge and understanding of the cases before them.19
Thus began the shift toward plausibility pleading. If one accepts Twombly’s
reasoning, however, it is counterintuitive to ask courts to do more with less
by requiring a merits-based determination at the pleading stage.
The structure of this Article is straightforward. In Part I, I review the
changes wrought by plausibility pleading. In Part II, I present the core of
my argument: namely, that it is unrealistic to expect judges to shoulder the
new burden of plausibility pleading given the structural and practical
changes in the work of the federal judiciary over the past fifty years. I
conclude the Article with remarks about the links between different procedural
eras and their would-be reformers.
I. FROM CONLEY TO IQBAL
Iqbal20 and its predecessor, Twombly,21 introduced a change in federal
pleading standards that had, until then, remained essentially static for
decades.22 In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established a
“notice pleading” system for federal courts via Rule 8(a)(2), abandoning

19
20
21
22

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559-60 & n.6 (2007).
556 U.S. 662.
550 U.S. 544.
The pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), first announced in
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), had remained in place despite intermittent attempts to
heighten pleading requirements for specific kinds of litigation. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman,
The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 998-1011 (2003) (summarizing different
categories of heightened pleading). By 2007, though, when Twombly was decided, only the
Eleventh Circuit explicitly maintained a heightened pleading standard for a specific type of case,
namely civil rights cases. See Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e must
keep in mind the heightened pleading requirements for civil rights cases, especially those
involving the defense of qualified immunity.”). By then, however, the Supreme Court had
consistently rejected lower courts’ attempts to apply heightened pleading standards to particular
kinds of cases. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002) (rejecting the Second
Circuit’s application of a heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases);
Leatherman v. Tarant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)
(holding that federal courts may not apply more-stringent-than-usual pleading standards to civil
rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In keeping with this message,
nearly every circuit other than the Eleventh had recognized that the sufficiency of complaints
should be assessed under a single standard, regardless of the substantive matter of the lawsuit. See
Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 989 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that Swierkiewicz abrogated the
Eighth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard for § 1983 suits and listing cases from the First,
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that reached the same conclusion);
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a heightened pleading standard in
qualified immunity cases).
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technical rules applied in both common law and code pleading jurisdictions.23
In 1957, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the notice pleading system
in Conley v. Gibson.24 Under this regime, complaints satisfied Rule 8(a)(2)
without providing detailed facts, so long as they provided adequate notice to
the defendant of the nature of the suit.25 In addition, a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) would not be granted “unless it appear[ed]
beyond doubt that the plaintiff c[ould] prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”26 Rule 12(b)(6) was to be
invoked in those rare cases in which no viable legal theory supported the
plaintiff ’s claim.27
Notice pleading remained the standard, subject to some detours by lower
courts,28 for the fifty years between Conley and Twombly. The Supreme
Court occasionally found it necessary to remind lower courts that the
pleading rules could not be changed outside the rulemaking process,29 even
as it acknowledged that heightened fact pleading might have “practical
merits.”30 Twombly was the first sign of change, and I will highlight three
significant aspects of the decision. First, the Court “retired” the language
from Conley that tested a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by whether “the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts”31 consistent with the defendant’s liability.32 Second, in
23 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438-40 (1986) (reviewing the history of pleading standards in England
and the United States prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules). For an overall history of
the Federal Rules, see generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
24 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
25 Id. at 47.
26 Id. at 45-46.
27 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of Transsubstantive
Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1191-92 (2010) (discussing the historic role of Rule 12(b)(6)).
28 Christopher Fairman, however, points to examples from many areas of law in which lower
courts have constructed heightened pleading standards, arguing that notice pleading, at least in
practice, has rarely been the rule. Fairman, supra note 22, at 998-1011. But this claim should not be
overstated. See supra note 22 (citing cases demonstrating that, by the time Twombly was announced,
most circuits had abandoned heightened pleading standards for particular types of cases).
29 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (reversing the Second Circuit’s
departure from notice pleading in employment discrimination cases); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting a heightened
pleading standard for § 1983 claims against municipalities); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (cautioning courts that issues of pleading, discovery, and summary judgment
should be resolved through rulemaking or legislation).
30 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
31 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45.
32 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 563 (2007) (reviewing criticisms of
Conley and concluding that expansive language of the case “has been questioned, criticized, and
explained away long enough” and had therefore “earned its retirement”).
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its place, Twombly substituted a “plausibility” inquiry,33 a term that was new
to Rule 12 adjudications.34 Finally, the Twombly Court justified its new
standard as necessary to protect defendants from the threat of burdensome
discovery that extracts settlements even for claims of dubious merit.35
“Careful case management” by district court judges had not worked,
according to the Court, necessitating recourse to plausibility pleading
standards.36
Twombly was not the last word, however, because some observers and
lower courts limited its reach to cases in which the costs of discovery were
likely to be high and settlement-coercing.37 Iqbal resolved this short-lived
dispute by making it clear that plausibility pleading applied to all civil cases,
not just antitrust claims.38 Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint.39 First, courts must review each
allegation in a complaint and exclude from consideration those allegations
stated in a “conclusory” fashion.40 Second, and consistent with Twombly,
courts must conduct a plausibility analysis that assesses the fit between the
nonconclusory facts alleged and the relief claimed.41 The judge may assess
plausibility by calling on her “judicial experience and common sense,”42 a
surprising turn from the judicial role contemplated in Conley.43 In sum, and
most important for this Article, plausibility pleading depends on the judge
to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the likelihood of a claim’s success.44
33
34

Id. at 556-57.
See Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the
Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3-9 (reviewing the use of the word
“plausible” in the summary judgment context).
35 550 U.S. at 558-59.
36 Id. at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 See, e.g., Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488-89 (6th Cir. 2009)
(suggesting that Twombly was “limited to expensive, complicated litigation” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
38 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (declaring that the “decision in Twombly expounded
the pleading standard for all civil actions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39 Id. at 678-79.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 679.
42 Id.
43 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (failing to provide any active role for the
judge at the pleading stage).
44 See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 143, 148 (2010) (describing plausibility pleading as an “explicit invitation for
the judge to use his or her own experience and intuitions as a baseline for whether a complaint can
proceed”); Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of Class
Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 711, 721 (2013) (arguing that
plausibility pleading “implicitly invites the judges to ask whether they believe the allegations”);
Tung Yin, “I Do Not Think [Implausible] Means What You Think It Means”: Iqbal v. Ashcroft and
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Plausibility pleading has taken the federal judicial world by storm. Iqbal
already has been cited by approximately 70,000 reported opinions in less
than five years, while Twombly has been cited 93,000 times over about six
and a half years.45 The cases have also earned a fair share of academic
attention. Many scholars have criticized Iqbal and Twombly for altering the
meaning of the Federal Rules outside of the traditional procedures contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act.46 Others have lamented the vague and illdefined standard for its break from history and difficulty of application.47
Scholars have even questioned the constitutionality of the plausibility
analysis.48 Some academics, however, find at least a kernel of opportunity in
the advent of plausibility pleading.49 Almost all commentators agree that
Iqbal and Twombly break from the liberal pleading doctrine enunciated in
1957 by Conley.50

Judicial Vouching for Government Officials, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 203, 215-16 (2010) (arguing
that the Supreme Court essentially performed “judicial vouching” in Iqbal by finding implausible
the plaintiff ’s assertions that the defendants could have intentionally discriminated against Arabs
and Muslims).
45 These figures are those reported by Westlaw’s KeyCite feature on February 14, 2014.
46 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 27, at 1191 (“In Twombly and Iqbal, . . . the Court ignored
the requirements of the Enabling Act and its own prior decisions on the difference between
judicial interpretation and judicial amendment.”); Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating
Jack H. Friedenthal: The Views of Two Co-authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 28 (2009) (“Although
Twombly did not alter the words of Rule 8(a)(2) itself, it substantially changed the provision’s
understood meaning.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 84-89 (2010) (discussing how Twombly and Iqbal, as
“legislative-like decisions,” work against the Supreme Court’s prior endorsements of the rulemaking
process); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 334 (2012) (“Critics of the new pleading regime have targeted [the Supreme Court’s]
unexpected willingness to alter the pleading standard through adjudication rather than through
rulemaking . . . .”).
47 See Donald J. Kochan, While Effusive, “Conclusory” Is Still Quite Elusive: The Story of a Word,
Iqbal, and a Perplexing Lexical Inquiry of Supreme Importance, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 215, 222-35 (2011)
(discussing the history of usage of the word “conclusory”); see also Reinert, supra note 13, at 22-28
(reviewing the Supreme Court’s use of the word “conclusory”).
48 Two scholars have argued that plausibility pleading violates the Seventh Amendment. See
generally Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the “Historical Test” for
Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REV. 467 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion
to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008).
49 Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 466-68
(2010) (arguing that plausibility pleading affords an opportunity to reconsider the Federal Rules’
trans-substantive approach); Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 646-47 (2011)
(maintaining that plausibility pleading allows courts “to adopt a blend of different, conflicting
interpretations of a statute (or procedure)—yielding an average result that compromises . . . between
competing preferences”).
50 Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 121-25 & nn.11-24
(2011).
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In conclusion, as others have argued, plausibility pleading has injected
instability into the spectrum of pleading.51 Plausibility pleading resembles
other heightened pleading regimes in some respects, but only enough to sow
confusion and doubt as to its application.52 Perhaps if one squints enough,
the plausibility inquiry looks like summary judgment,53 but that provides
little assistance at the pleading stage. It is not only the pleading standard’s
content that has changed, but also the terms of the debate. Courts now
expect the pleader to shoulder new and different burdens,54 and courts also
impose new responsibilities on pleading itself. The next Part shows why
plausibility pleading cannot realistically meet these expectations.
II. (MIS)FITTING PLAUSIBILITY PLEADINGS INTO
OUR CURRENT PROCEDURAL LANDSCAPE
“Each aspect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or any state code of procedure)
is part of a complex, highly interdependent system that collectively governs the litigation process. Any alteration of one structure inevitably affects the functioning of
the others, which, in turn, affects the entire process.”
–Arthur R. Miller55

Arthur Miller’s words capture the dynamic interplay among the multiple
layers of our procedural system—an interplay that is particularly relevant to
recent changes in pleading doctrine. Unfortunately, whether conceived of as
an innovative or retrograde doctrine, plausibility pleading does not fit
neatly in the existing procedural world. This argument, based on plausibility
pleading’s compatibility with the wider procedural landscape, differs from
the criticism that Iqbal and Twombly—like many decisions before them—
51 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (“The new approach . . . clashes . . . with the prior procedural
system [and] magnifies the destabilizing effect that comes from cutting a procedural system from
its moorings.”).
52 See, e.g., id. at 832-33 (discussing differences between plausibility pleading and historical
“fact pleading”). For example, in some respects, the Twombly–Iqbal distinction between conclusory
and factual allegations resembles the distinction courts make between conclusions of law and
conclusions of fact, and between ultimate facts and evidential facts. See Charles E. Clark, The Code
Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 832 (1924) (criticizing the idea of distinctions between these
categories of allegations).
53 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 28-34 (discussing the similarities and differences
between Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions).
54 See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 13, at 32-35 (discussing plausibility pleading as an “informationforcing” regime).
55 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 427, 446 (1991).
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continue to restrict access to the courthouse.56 This Part does not dispute
the latter claim, but rather seeks to show an even more complicated problem.
Our legal system, given earlier changes, cannot reliably sustain the burdens
that plausibility pleading now imposes.
Plausibility pleading requires judges to perform a novel and important
task at the pleading stage: assess pleadings for their substantive merit, or
their “plausibility.” For judges to apply the plausibility pleading standard
effectively, they must have relevant judicial experience and reliable common
sense upon which to rest their decisions. When one considers our “complex,
highly interdependent” legal system,57 asking judges to rely on their “judicial
experience and common sense”58 to assess plausibility is ill-advised, because
federal judges have become increasingly removed from merits-based
adjudication. Rather than rely on sound judicial experience, judges might
rely on unreliable heuristics that take them further from accurate conclusions.
Indeed, the dearth of judicial experience may partly explain why, as the
available empirical data suggest, plausibility pleading has not effectively
filtered cases on the basis of merit.59
A. The Minimal Experience of Judges in Merits-Based Determinations
1. The Vanishing Trial
The first place one might look for judicial experience in assessing merit
would be trial adjudication. Data show, however, that the number of trials in
both state and federal courts has significantly declined over the past seventyfive years.60 In 1938, nearly 20% of filed cases were tried,61 a percentage that
56 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 44, at 145-48 (comparing plausibility pleading and the Rule 56
summary judgment trilogy and showing that “the likely effect of both is to reduce access by
plaintiffs to trial and juries”); Miller, supra note 14, at 346 (“[Under Twombly and Iqbal], even when
a potential plaintiff ’s claims may have merit, cases may not be initiated because the risk of loss
without any prospect of compensation . . . is too great.”).
57 Miller, supra note 55, at 446.
58 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
59 See Reinert, supra note 50, at 161 (presenting data that show, inter alia, that “Iqbal and
Twombly pose the potential to eliminate cases that have better than a 50% chance of being
successful”).
60 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 464 fig.1 (2004) (showing that the
number of civil trials across all U.S. district courts dropped from more than 12,000 in the 1980s to
less than 5000 in 2002); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705, 713 tbl.1 (2004) (presenting trial statistics from 1970 through 2000). But see
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 520-21 n.115
(1986) (arguing that data regarding trial prevalence seventy-five years ago may be unreliable).
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dropped to about 12% by the 1950s, and then to 1.7% by 2003.62 And although
total dispositions increased five-fold between 1962 and 2000, the absolute
number of trials decreased by one-fifth.63 Overall, the data indicate that our
legal system no longer disposes of many more cases by trial than by summary
judgment; much the opposite, it is now much more common to dispose of
cases through summary judgment than through trial.64
As a consequence, judges increasingly lack the experience of seeing a
case through from its pleading stage to its ultimate resolution by a factfinder.
The result of this decrease in trial experience manifests itself in the settlement
context, and some commentators observe that settlement reflects the “strategic
position of repeat players”65 more than calculations about the merits.
Most important for this Article, having fewer trials leaves judges with
less “judicial experience” in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
cases.66 Moreover, legal doctrine and arguments become increasingly removed
from the facts, “[c]ontests of interpretation replace contests of proof,” and the
law’s impact on primary conduct becomes more indeterminate.67 These
trends limit the effectiveness of a judge attempting to apply a plausibility
standard at the pleading stage. If a judge were to ask herself, “Does this
claim resemble any I have seen in the past?” and “How did those claims
turn out?,” she would have few answers on which to rely.
2. The Rise of Private Adjudication
Yet another trend limiting judicial experience in merits-based determinations
is the growth of arbitration and alternative dispute resolution. Since at least
the 1980s, the Supreme Court has found in the Federal Arbitration Act a
national policy that favors arbitration agreements.68 There is little question
61 Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments Entered by the Federal Courts
Has Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469, 469 (2009).
62 Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1258-59 (2005).
63 See Galanter, supra note 60, at 461-64 & tbl.1, fig.1 (describing and presenting data from
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
64 See id. at 484 (“In 1975, the portion of disposition by trial (8.4 percent) was more than
double the portion of summary judgments (3.7 percent), but in 2000 the summary judgment
portion (7.7 percent) was more than three times as large as the portion of trials (2.2 percent).”).
65 Id. at 526.
66 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 566 (1991) (arguing that, in the securities class action context,
judges lack the ability to foster substantively accurate settlements).
67 Galanter, supra note 60, at 530.
68 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748-49 (2011) (describing the
primary goals of the Federal Arbitration Act and case law discussing the policy of the act); see also
Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47
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that arbitration has expanded in response.69 Predispute arbitration agreements have evolved from being highly contested to being fully accepted by
federal courts.70 The rise of private adjudication, in turn, has at least two
consequences relevant here. First, it is one more means by which judges are
removed from their traditional adjudicatory role. Second, because private
dispute resolution is usually confidential, judges and the public are deprived
of additional information about the nature and quality of particular areas of
litigation. Both of these consequences matter for plausibility pleading
because they affect the quality of judicial experience available for assessing
the merits of a particular dispute.
As the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements have increased,
arbitration has become ubiquitous across disparate areas of the law. One
scholar estimated that between 15% and 25% of employers adopted arbitration
agreements to resolve employment disputes in 2009.71 A more recent study
found that mandatory arbitration clauses are present in almost 77% of
consumer contracts and 93% of employment contracts.72 And the percentage
of employees covered by such agreements is likely a fair bit higher than the
percentage of employers who use them because larger employers are more
likely to adopt mandatory arbitration agreements.73
The goal of arbitration, of course, is to reduce costs and risks associated
with litigation.74 Merchants may view arbitration as cheaper, faster, and less
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1715 (2006) (recognizing the “national policy favoring arbitration”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
69 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the
Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & E MP. POL’Y J. 405, 408-12 (2007) (reviewing empirical studies
of employment arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S.
Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 831, 834 (2002) (“Together, these major decisions have inspired numerous
companies to require their customers and employees to arbitrate rather than litigate future
disputes.”).
70 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9-11
(reviewing the expansion of arbitration in the twentieth century).
71 Colvin, supra note 69, at 411.
72 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 880, 882-84
(2008) (reporting on a survey of consumer contracts for companies with “significant market shares
or name recognition in the telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries” and
results from an employment contract database).
73 Colvin, supra note 69, at 410.
74 See John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating Employment
Arbitration Agreements in the United States and Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1007, 1009-11
(2002) (suggesting that corporate employers embrace arbitration because they distrust the legal
system and fear large jury awards); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 204 (1997) (citing a study finding that 75% of employers
surveyed adopted arbitration plans to reduce litigation costs); Colvin, supra note 69, at 411-12

1778

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 1767

transparent than litigation.75 Courts, too, seem to have embraced arbitration
agreements in part because they reduce litigation.76 Indeed, one key narrative
on the Supreme Court’s road to arbitration is that arbitration is no better or
worse than judicial resolution of competing claims.77
Whatever one’s view of the relative value of procedures for adjudication
in public courts, the private nature of arbitration and its ken make plausibility
pleading yet more difficult to apply. Most important, arbitrators generally
do not publish or explain their decisions, essentially leaving everyone but
the parties in the dark about the facts of the dispute and the reasons for how
the dispute was resolved.78 Indeed, it is the confidentiality of arbitration
that makes it so appealing to many parties.79 This secrecy has earned its
critics, who recognize that one of arbitration’s costs is the loss of information
that one can obtain from public trials and proceedings—information which
permits litigants to better evaluate the law and make critical decisions.80 But
critics have not focused on the negative effect that increased private dispute
resolution has on judicial experience—experience critical for judges who
now have to assess a claim’s plausibility early in the life cycle of a case.
3. Secret Settlements
Along with private adjudication, the principal reason most cases do not
proceed to trial is that they are settled.81 And settlements can bear on a
(summarizing data suggesting that past experiences with litigation were the primary driver for
employers who adopted employment arbitration).
75 Sternlight, supra note 69, at 832.
76 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 661 (1996) (suggesting that, in encouraging arbitration,
the Supreme Court was “at least influenced by a desire to conserve judicial resources”).
77 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.”).
78 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 455-56 (1996)
(comparing arbitration to adjudication).
79 Id. at 456.
80 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 322-27 (1995)
(questioning the use of arbitrators to resolve public law disputes because confidentiality undermines enforcement efforts); see also Sternlight, supra note 69, at 839 (discussing the failure of
arbitration to educate the public about claims and defenses that arise in public law litigation, such
as those involving consumer safety, employment discrimination, and abuses by financial institutions).
81 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of
Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 319-21 (1999) (explaining, from an economic
perspective, why the vast majority of cases settle).
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judge’s assessment of plausibility. After all, if settlements enable a putative
plaintiff to better evaluate the connection between a defendant’s conduct
and the plaintiff ’s injury,82 they would be of similar benefit to judges
assessing the plausibility of that claim and other similar claims.83 But
confidential settlements have become the norm in most private law cases,
further depriving courts of potentially relevant information.84
Secret settlements have been criticized on multiple grounds. First, they
interfere with the ability of lawyers and judges to accurately assess the
merits of any particular settlement85 and with the public’s ability to accurately
monitor health and safety issues.86 Moreover, secret settlements erode a
court’s ability to reliably understand background states of affairs because
82 See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Informational Externalities in Settlement
Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability, 33 RAND J. ECON. 587, 592 (2002) (“The
disposition of P1’s suit is likely to affect the probability that P2 makes the connection between her
injury and D’s activity.”).
83 Cf. Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access
to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 402-03 (2006) (arguing
that publicly available discovery has the potential to verify allegations of wrongdoing).
84 See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927,
945-46 (2006) (observing that often, the only document filed with the court is a joint stipulation
of dismissal on grounds of settlement); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic
Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869 (2007) (noting that public
settlements are the exception); Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed Settlement Agreements,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 459 (2006) (noting that it is common for settlement agreements to
be confidential, even if a formal request to seal settlement documents is not made in most cases).
85 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 66, at 567 (noting that “in a world where all cases settle, it
may not even be possible to base settlements on the merits because lawyers may not be able to
make reliable estimates of expected trial outcomes”); Moss, supra note 84, at 898 (“When more
settlements are public, other attorneys and parties can make better estimates of the settlement
values of their own claims, because they can see the settlement amounts—the ‘pL’ estimates—in
prior similar cases.”); Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG. 889, 920
(2012) (“If settlements are routinely filed under seal, courts will lack the comparative data needed
to gauge the fairness of settlements submitted for their approval.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical
Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 517 (1994) (discussing the utility of
settlements for case valuation in the mass tort context).
86 See generally Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s
New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 792 (2004) (citing the Firestone
litigation as an example of the negative impact of confidential orders, given that recalls and federal
investigation of defect tires were not initiated until eight years after the first product liability
suits); Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended
Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2006) (providing examples of secret settlements of
cases involving public health hazards, including automobiles, vaccines, painkillers, heart valves,
toxic leak sites, asbestos, tobacco, and breast implants, among others); Goldstein, supra note 83, at
401-03 (noting that, unlike many European countries, the United States relies on civil litigation to
reveal information of public interest); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm,
83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2650 (1995) (discussing public controversy about secret settlements concealing
health and safety matters in the 1980s); Moss, supra note 84, at 906-08 (explaining how secret
settlements render consumers unable to distinguish between safe and unsafe products).
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courts themselves cannot investigate and present facts.87 For a court required
to assess the “plausibility” of a particular claim, ignorance about the substantive content of settlements of similar claims will be another barrier to
accuracy.
4. Access to Discovery
Protective orders preventing disclosure of information learned during
discovery have also become routine.88 They have proliferated largely because
the actors in any given case—the litigants and the judge—often have
converging interests in maintaining secrecy.89 To the extent that the propriety
of protective orders has been debated, discussion has focused on informational
costs to the public and other litigants. Critics of protective orders maintain
that both the public and other litigants have valid interests in obtaining
discovery in pending lawsuits,90 while proponents argue that litigation is not
87 Owen Fiss spoke more broadly to some of these concerns in the context of settlement
itself, predicting that, for example, a judge called upon to modify a consent decree will lack
competence precisely because “[h]e has no basis for assessing the request.” Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083-85 (1984).
88 See Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (“Consensual secrecy pervades virtually
every phase of modern civil litigation.”); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 (1983) (noting that “parties are often overzealous” in making
confidentiality designations).
89 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.18 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that
courts sign off on blanket protective orders because “the time that it would take a judicial officer to
rule on the protectability of thousands of documents could cripple the court,” and because the
document-by-document approach would be unduly expensive for the parties); William G. Childs,
When the Bell Can’t Be Unrung: Document Leaks and Protective Orders in Mass Tort Litigation, 27 REV.
LITIG. 565, 566 (2008) (explaining that parties to mass tort litigation often agree to protective
orders because they are “a practical way to deal with the sheer volume of exhibits,” they respect
some documents’ legitimate need for secrecy, and they provide additional settlement leverage for
plaintiffs); Goldstein, supra note 83, at 415-16 (arguing that “[t]he routine granting of umbrella
protective orders . . . benefits defendants and judges at the expense of the public”); Marcus,
supra note 88, at 9 (describing antitrust defendants’ motivation to keep documents confidential to
prevent disclosure to codefendant competitors that might itself be used in later antitrust litigation
as evidence of price-fixing); Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L.
& POL’Y 53, 57-58 (2000) (“Defendants want to avoid disclosure of damaging information.
Plaintiffs desire to use this damaging information as a negotiation tool for larger settlements for
clients in the future.”).
90 See Doré, supra note 88, at 306-07 (summarizing the views of “public access advocates”);
Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 67,
92 (2000) (focusing on how sharing discovery among cases based upon closely related situations
saves time and costs); Goldstein, supra note 83, at 375-79 (arguing that protective orders threaten
public health and safety interests); Luban, supra note 86, at 2653 (noting that public access to
discovery information “might save lives” and “inform[] public deliberation about an issue of
substantial political significance”); Alan B. Morrison, Essay, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants
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a venue for generating information to be shared collectively.91 This emphasis
on the public’s access to information, while important, unfortunately
obscures the importance of judicial access to information. To the extent that
judicial interests have been considered at all in this debate, the focus has
been on how protective orders aid judges by conserving their scarce resources
and time.92 Lost in the commentary, however, is any recognition that
providing greater informational access to judges will improve the quality of
their decisionmaking—particularly when judges must consider alternative
explanations for the misconduct alleged by plaintiffs in light of their
“judicial experience and common sense.”93
Drawing upon an example from litigation against General Motors, one
can imagine how the confidentiality of discovery materials can interact with
judicial assessments of plausibility. In 1992, General Motors settled a
lawsuit with the family of a man who had died in his GM pickup truck,
which caught fire after a side-impact collision with another vehicle.94 The
amount of the settlement and all documents exchanged during discovery
were treated as confidential by the parties.95 Indeed, as a condition of the
settlement, the family was made to return to General Motors all documents
provided by the company.96 After suit was brought pursuant to a Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure permitting courts to make public certain discovery
information when it relates to disclosures that “have a probable adverse
effect upon the general public health or safety,”97 General Motors ultimately
released the documents.98 Apparently, the company had known since 1974
that its fuel tank design posed a “greater fire hazard than other fuel tank
and the Public Interest in Disclosure; Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 109, 115-16
(1989) (arguing that disallowing sharing of information among plaintiffs’ attorneys maximizes
inefficiency); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 662-63
(2005) (noting that protective orders may interfere with disclosure of information to regulatory
bodies such as the FDA).
91 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. R EV.
457, 472 (treating courts as best situated for information management, not information production
or consumption); Miller, supra note 55, at 467 (arguing against the presumption that all litigation
is important to the public).
92 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 55, at 488-89 (opining that asking courts to analyze and disseminate
discovery information “would distract judges from their primary mission”).
93 Andrew Goldstein has discussed the role of confidentiality in preventing the public from
monitoring judicial behavior or seeking education about courts’ everyday activities, but not how
access to information assists judges themselves. Goldstein, supra note 83, at 381-82.
94 Id. at 419.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c).
98 Goldstein, supra note 83, at 420.
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configurations, but had not changed the design until 1988.”99 Now, consider
a judge, prior to the release of the General Motors records, evaluating a
complaint alleging that General Motors “knew” that the placement of fuel
tanks on its pickup trucks was unnecessarily dangerous. A judge who was
aware of the documents unsealed after the 1992 settlement would surely
evaluate plausibility differently from a judge who was ignorant of those
documents.
In fact, judges sometimes do use this kind of information to assess complaints under a plausibility regime. Judge Nancy Gertner, for instance, took
notice of the public attention devoted to sexual abuse in prisons to find that
a complaint raised a plausible inference of deliberate indifference.100 Judge
Jack Weinstein surveyed his colleagues on the bench and concluded that
New York City police officers, as a general matter, engaged in “repeated,
widespread falsification,” and, therefore, that a constitutional claim against
New York City was plausible.101 Where such information from prior cases is
unavailable, however, courts have relied on their own suppositions and
assumptions to find a claim implausible. In the Southern District of New
York, for example, a court dismissed a § 1983 claim against the City of New
York that alleged that an officer’s actions in violation of the Fourth
Amendment were pursuant to an unwritten City policy, instead finding it
more plausible that the officer who carried out the search “was a rogue
officer who disobeyed City policy.”102 Similarly, in a suit against a Tennessee
county under a “class of one” theory of equal protection, the Court found an
“obvious alternative explanation” for the differential treatment of plaintiffs
was that the defendants “made a mistake in applying the law”—not that
they singled out plaintiffs for pernicious reasons.103 Thus, to the extent that
99 Id.
100 See

Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (D. Mass. 2009) (“Given the public attention
devoted to sexual abuse in prisons writ large, . . . it is a fair inference from the pleadings that
prison officials . . . were deliberately indifferent to the risks and reality of this abuse.”).
101 See Colon v. City of New York, No. 09-0008, 2009 WL 4263362, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,
2009) (noting that “[i]nformal inquiry by the court and among the judges of this court . . . has
revealed anecdotal evidence of repeated, widespread falsification by arresting police officers of the
New York City Police Department”).
102 5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 268, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
103 Arnold v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 09-0163, 2009 WL 2430822,
at *4-5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2009) (“When confronted with nothing more than bare assertions of
unlawful activity, a court’s first instinct is not to conclude that a violation occurred when it could
‘just as well be’ explained as innocent conduct.”). For another example of a court making a
plausibility determination based on personal assumptions, see Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., No.
09-291, 2009 WL 4508581, at *10 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2009), which found conclusory the allegation that
defendants were part of a RICO enterprise, a conclusion drawn in part from the court’s “common
experience.”
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the trend toward keeping discovery confidential continues, judges will have
even less basis for assessing the merits of a particular claim at the pleading stage.
5. A Potential Counter-Narrative: Summary Judgment
Even though judicial trial experience is limited, one might think that
judicial experience with the merits-based determination at summary
judgment is a sufficient substitute. After all, summary judgment is the
procedural landmark that looms largest after the pleading stage. Moreover,
the availability of summary judgment—if not its frequency—has increased
since the Rule 56 trilogy of 1986.104 Given the decline of the jury trial and
the rise of settlement, summary judgment has, for many lawsuits, become
the final point of judicial intervention.105
Yet there are several reasons to doubt the notion that experience adjudicating summary judgment motions provides judges with ample grounds for
assessing a claim’s plausibility at the pleading stage. First, cases that reach
the summary judgment stage are not necessarily representative of the
distribution of strong and weak cases throughout the federal docket. Due to
the prevalence of settlement, both strong and weak cases are likely removed
from the pool of cases adjudicated on the merits.106 Second, because the
summary judgment decision is made before the judge has the most and
highest-quality information, there is a real risk of error.107 This error may be
104 See Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment”
Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without
Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 688-89 (2012–
2013) (discussing the increased use of summary judgment to resolve cases over several decades of
employment discrimination jurisprudence); Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex:
Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
81, 87 (2006) (relying on empirical evidence that “[f]ederal courts cite Matsushita, Anderson, and
Celotex more than any decisions ever issued by a federal tribunal”).
105 See Bennett, supra note 104, at 691-92 (noting that the trilogy has made summary judgment, not jury trials, the “Holy Grail” of litigation (quoting Mark W. Bennett, Judges’ Views on
Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 307 (2005))); Edward Brunet, Essay, The Efficiency of
Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689, 697-99 (2012) (arguing that summary judgment
determinations can prompt a settlement); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1016 (2003) (declaring summary judgment the “focal point”
of modern litigation).
106 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-30 (1984) (presenting a model for determining whether the parties will settle
or continue litigating a dispute).
107 See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 739-42, 755-74 (1989) (discussing the
trend away from jury trials to summary judgment proceedings and the resulting accuracy
concerns); Miller, supra note 105, at 1042 (noting that some plaintiffs with likely meritorious claims
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amplified by the 1986 trilogy, which had the effect of skewing summary
judgment in a pro-defendant direction.108 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp.,109 like Iqbal and Twombly, gave judges the power
to engage in docket reduction by deeming certain allegations “implausible”
based on the judge’s perspective on human motivation.110 Celotex permitted
defendants to move for summary judgment without providing any affirmative
evidence at all.111 And, for certain cases, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,112
heightened the burden on plaintiffs resisting summary judgment.113 Finally,
there are also reasons to question the ability of judges to resolve summary
judgment motions without applying subjective standards of believability
according to their own inaccessible, irrefutable, and arguably unrepresentative cultural norms.114
Plausibility pleading presents even more troubling risks of error and bias
than summary judgment. After all, the summary judgment standard is at
least well understood in theory, even if its application is contested. Summary judgment resolutions are also more transparent; they are based on
public evidence that has already passed the Rubicon of admissibility. The
public can therefore evaluate summary judgment decisions by an external
standard—what a reasonable person could find true given the available

cannot afford to assemble a prima facie case prior to trial); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:
The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 171-81 (1988) (identifying the limitations of summary judgment and
arguing that the increased use of summary judgment will ultimately generate less accurate
adjudication).
108 Stempel, supra note 107, at 181 (“[T]he ‘new’ summary judgment shifts the system’s results
in favor of defendants and against claimants as well as permits this shift to occur upon a less rich
data base.”).
109 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
110 Stempel, supra note 107, at 102 (stating that, to the Matsushita majority, the plaintiffs’
theory of the case failed, because the actions attributed to the defendants “were not the practices
of prudent businesspeople and therefore almost certainly could not have occurred”).
111 See id. at 105-06 (noting that the Celotex majority only required the defendant moving for
summary judgment to point out in the record the lack of any evidence to support the plaintiff ’s
contentions).
112 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
113 See id. at 103-05 (explaining that the Anderson Court required that “a movant’s evidence
opposing a properly made summary judgment motion must be more than merely possible or
colorable,” but rather “must be of sufficient probative value to withstand a directed verdict motion
and support the verdict of a reasonable jury”).
114 Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 881-87 (2009) (discussing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372 (2007), and finding, after surveying people who viewed the Scott videotape, that the Court’s
“view of the facts . . . divide[d] citizens on social, cultural, and political lines”).
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evidence.115 The bases for plausibility determinations, by contrast, are
opaque at best and invisible at worst. Studying the reliability of plausibility
assessments by federal judges presents several obstacles. For instance, it is
not clear what would constitute a proper comparison population.116 As a
result, it is more difficult to evaluate the extent to which judicial assessments
of plausibility are culturally bound than it is to make similar evaluations in
the summary judgment context.
The end result of all of these trends is a federal judiciary that has very
little experience evaluating the merits of claims. Trials have decreased and
cases have been shunted away from federal court by arbitration doctrine.
Information that might assist in assessing plausibility, such as discovery and
settlement information, is increasingly inaccessible. And summary judgment
adjudication cannot make up for this lack of information and experience.
Overall, it is fair to say that we have transitioned from a 1938 litigation
practice that encouraged adjudications on the merits to a contemporary
practice that seeks to dispose of cases as efficiently as possible.117 When we
move away from public adjudication, we lose something important: information about how our justice system works to resolve disputes.118 This
information, and the process by which it is divulged, is important not only
for its own sake but also for reinforcing a democratic norm of equal
accountability.119 What is sometimes overlooked, however, is that the information is important to ensuring legitimate and reliable future adjudication.
Instead of allowing judges to gain experience in adjudicating cases, we have
turned them into “efficiency experts trying to curtail run-away cases and
provoke settlements, largely on an ad hoc basis.”120 The drafters of the
Federal Rules have been accused of having had unrealistically high expecta-

115 Cf. id. at 886-87 (criticizing the result in Scott because it disagreed with assessments of the
evidence by certain marginalized groups).
116 Plausibility pleading is not meant to substitute for jury assessments. Rather, it appears to
contemplate subjective differences from judge to judge. It is not clear what standard one would use
to instruct a comparison population, nor is it clear what evidence the study population would
evaluate.
117 See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents,
61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 286, 291 (2008) (contrasting the 1938 objective to resolve cases through a
fair trial with the current trend of “resolving formally filed litigation short of actual trial”).
118 Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
579, 669 (2010) (describing the benefits of public trials).
119 See id. at 667 (“Lawsuits in democratic regimes oblige even the government to disgorge
information and hence to be subjected to scrutiny.”).
120 Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural
System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 101 (1997).
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tions of federal judges’ abilities to manage their dockets.121 The advocates of
plausibility pleading, however, appear to have placed even higher expectations
on the judiciary, without accounting for the more significant barriers posed
by the dynamics of our current procedural regime.
B. Plausibility Pleading and Cognitive Bias
The expectations associated with plausibility pleading are unrealistic not
only because of the changing content of judges’ daily work, as discussed
above, but also because of how judges apply their prior experience to new
cases. When judges attempt to evaluate the merits of a claim, cognitive
biases may taint their assessment precisely because the judges’ prior experience
with actual merits-based determinations is so thin.122 Cognitive biases are,
of course, only biases. They can be overcome, they do not operate in
isolation, and they are not uniform. Yet they cannot be ignored. And
although cognitive biases may have an impact on many kinds of judicial
decisionmaking, several well-studied biases seem particularly relevant to the
plausibility pleading standard.
One cognitive bias that may play a role in judicial merits assessments
relates to the well-known importance of first impressions: belief perseverance.123 After forming an initial belief, “we tend to disregard evidence that
contradicts that hypothesis and exaggerate evidence that confirms it.”124
This is particularly problematic if one’s basis for drawing the initial conclusion is insubstantial, because it will be a challenge to “interpret correctly
subsequent better information that is inconsistent with that hypothesis.”125
Combined with confirmatory bias—the tendency to interpret ambiguous
information as supportive of one’s initial hypothesis, particularly when that
information is complex—belief perseverance makes clear the importance of
initial hypotheses.126 Thus, if a judge starts (or arrives after experience) at
121 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin’s New–Old Procedure
as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Problem,” 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 82 (1994) (“The original
rulemakers overestimated judges’ ability to efficiently control discovery, to shape litigation in the
face of notice pleading, to appreciate the fine distinctions between a weak case and one deserving
summary disposition, and to control errant lawyers and juries.”).
122 Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger
Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation,
and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 740-49 (2011).
123 For a brief explanation of this phenomenon, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 646-47
(1999).
124 Id. at 646.
125 Id. at 647.
126 See id. at 647-48.
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the belief that a certain category of cases is overrepresented with high- or
low-merit claims, it will likely affect the judge’s assessment of the plausibility
of the next similar claim. And this belief may persist even when faced with
new and better information to the contrary.
Moreover, to the extent that caution is desirable in making certain plausibility determinations, some judges will exhibit overconfidence bias that
hinders their ability to make such determinations, especially when the
standard being applied explicitly permits them to base their decision on
their “judicial experience and common sense.” Judges, like most people,
overestimate their abilities and underestimate their own biases.127 Judges
also often falsely believe that others see the world in the same way that they
do.128 Finally, the representativeness heuristic “prompts people to complete
an indeterminate picture in accord with preconceived patterns of thought,
experience, or association,” a particular problem when judges have so little
information to call upon to determine the plausibility of a particular
claim.129
Similar caution is in order when courts must assess the probabilities
associated with a certain claim at the pleading stage, an inquiry that the
Iqbal Court contemplated (and engaged in). When assessing probabilities,
people often begin by setting an arbitrary baseline estimate “for which they
make insufficient adjustments.”130 That baseline is influenced by evidence
that is “particularly salient, vivid, or easily ‘available’” to the decisionmaker,
even if that evidence is not empirically rigorous.131 And even when a judge
has access to reliable and relevant statistical data, she may still substitute
unrepresentative conclusions drawn from past events that are easily called to
memory.132 Relatedly, we tend to overrate the representativeness of the
small sample consisting of our own experience.133 The result for probabilistic
assessments is significant: mental shortcuts can easily result in an estimate
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Stempel, supra note 122, at 743-44 (elaborating on this “self-serving or egocentric bias”).
See id. at 744-46 (describing a “false consensus bias” operating in conjunction with other
heuristics).
129 Id. at 747.
130 Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND E CONOMICS 1, 5 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
131 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 123, at 662 (discussing the “availability heuristic” bias that
affects probability perceptions).
132 Id. at 663-64 (providing, as an example, evidence that people tend to assess a city’s crime
rate by whether they personally know someone who has been victimized there, rather than by
crime statistics).
133 Id. at 665 (reviewing evidence from study of experienced research psychologists who
“honored the fallacious law of small numbers”).
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that has “little or no relationship to actual probabilities,” and the decisionmaker
will be far too optimistic about the reliability of this estimate.134
The presence of these heuristics has led some scholars to call for restraint
when judges resolve motions for summary judgment.135 One can easily see
how these biases could also undermine the accuracy of plausibility pleading
determinations. A judge seeking to assess the “plausibility” of a claim for
relief may be tempted to call upon her store of experience with similar
cases. But, as I argue above, that experience is seriously limited and likely
unrepresentative. After all, the vast majority of past similar cases settled,
and the judge was likely unaware of the settlement amount, let alone the
facts that motivated the settlement. Actual merits-based assessments—trials
and motions for summary judgment—are also of limited utility for the
reasons explained above.
Finally, the atmospherics of plausibility pleading—the consequences of
pleadings surviving motions to dismiss—may function to reduce the
reliability of judicial assessments of merit. Costs and benefits posed by risks
are generally not assessed independently of each other. In other words, if a
particular risk “is perceived as posing high costs, it tends also to be perceived
as posing low benefits.”136 So if a judge assessing plausibility perceives
allowing discovery as a risk that imposes a high cost (namely, the possibility
of coercing the defendant to settle), that judge is likely to view the benefits
of opening that door to be lower than they are in actuality. If, by contrast,
the judge focuses on the risk of eliminating a meritorious claim, her assessment
of the benefit of permitting the claim to go forward will relate to how she
values the claim in the first place.
The heuristics discussed above could impact the assessment of any kind
of claim. But some implicit biases that track explicit racial, gender, or ethnic
prejudice137 may specifically affect plausibility analysis for particular kinds
of claims. For example, in determining employment discrimination claims,
the role of implicit racial bias can be quite prominent. This is particularly
problematic because the plaintiff will rarely have direct evidence of discrim-
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Id. at 667.
See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 636 (2012) (asserting that “judges
should be reluctant to grant summary judgment unless there is essentially no serious prospect that
others will disagree” about what the facts of the case show).
136 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 123, at 671.
137 See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128-32 (2012)
(reviewing empirical data supporting findings of prejudicial attitudes in cognitive biases).
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ination.138 A judge’s assessment of plausibility is therefore susceptible to
influence by his implicit biases related to discrimination and its prevalence
in the workplace.139 And because many judges believe themselves to be more
objective than their average colleague (a mathematical impossibility), judges
are particularly vulnerable to such biases.140
CONCLUSION
“The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the
preceding generation’s procedural reforms.”
–Judith Resnik141
“I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be made to
do the service of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be
disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings . . . . I have spent a lifetime studying,
teaching, and working in this field and I assert dogmatically that strict special
pleading has never been found workable or even useful in English and American
law.”
–Hon. Charles E. Clark142

Both Professor Resnik and Judge Clark are right when it comes to plausibility
pleading. At the Federal Rules’ fiftieth-anniversary conference, Paul
Carrington predicted that pressure to make novel use of Rule 12 could come
from impatience with summary judgment’s “ineffectiveness as a tool for
dealing with unfounded contentions”—pressure that did not abate with the
announcement of the 1986 trilogy.143 Ultimately the pressure for change
came—as it almost always has—from the perceived high costs of discovery.
When the Supreme Court turned toward plausibility pleading in Twombly,
its justification was rooted in the fear that defendants would be coerced into
138 Id. at 1153-56 (summarizing studies showing that implicit bias affects employer decisionmaking).
139 See Trina Jones, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 433-34 (2010)
(arguing that employment discrimination claims have to overcome the judicial assumption that
“discrimination is rare and aberrant”); see also Kang et al., supra note 137, at 1159-64 (pointing to
research suggesting that judges ruling on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment
likely rule on only enough facts to generate or implicate social biases).
140 See Kang et al., supra note 137, at 1172-73 (highlighting research showing that judges think
highly of their own objectivity); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (“[ J]udges might be overconfident about
their abilities to control their own biases.”).
141 Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 624 (1985).
142 Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 46-47 (1957).
143 Carrington, supra note 6, at 2106.
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settling meritless claims to avoid substantial discovery costs.144 Responding
to the dissent’s claim that the majority’s fear of discovery was overblown
and could be mitigated by careful judicial management, the Court responded
that the “hope of effective judicial supervision is slim” under the current
system.145 The source of the Court’s pessimism was a 1989 article by Judge
Easterbrook, from which it quoted extensively.146 Easterbrook emphasized
that courts are ill-equipped to supervise discovery competently because
pleadings generally lack detail: “We cannot prevent what we cannot detect;
we cannot detect what we cannot define; we cannot define ‘abusive’ discovery
except in theory, because in practice we lack essential information.”147
It is worth taking a moment to consider the logic of the Twombly
Court’s argument. At its heart, it seems to be saying that because judges
cannot and do not know enough to supervise discovery, we will instead ask
judges to do more with even less information at the pleading stage. Moreover,
the consequences of judges’ decisions at that stage will be even more severe.
Granting a motion to dismiss will end the plaintiff ’s case; denying the
motion will leave the defendant exposed to the same “in terrorem” fear of
costly discovery that concerned the Court in Twombly.148 No matter how one
approaches the problem, however, for plausibility pleading to work, judges
must be well-positioned to apply it. I have tried to argue here that, whether
one accepts the Twombly Court’s pessimism about the “hope of effective
judicial supervision” in a notice pleading regime, there is reason to be just as
pessimistic about the prospect of accurate judicial application of plausibility
pleading, “[g]iven the system that we have.”149
At the same time, plausibility pleading may meet the perceived needs of
the current generation in the same way that notice pleading met the needs
of the 1938 generation.150 For instance, one can trace the motivation to
implement notice pleading to the perception that ordinary businesspeople
would otherwise lose faith in traditional adjudication, filled with potholes
that could sink a meritorious claim on the basis of hypertechnical and

144 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (discussing the “enormous expense”
of discovery).
145 Id. at 560 n.6.
146 Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635,
638-39 (1989)).
147 Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. R EV. 635, 638-39
(1989).
148 550 U.S. at 546.
149 Id. at 560 n.6.
150 See Resnik, supra note 60, at 540-42 (comparing the adjudicatory concerns of past generations
with current procedural needs).
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confusing common law rules.151 If Thomas Shelton, who, in 1922, viewed the
then-proposed Federal Rules as a means to reduce political dissent, thought
that arcane rules were “making Bolshevists” by dismissing claims on a “technicality,”152 today’s reformers see defendants losing faith in the legal system
due to burdensome discovery imposed by a plaintiff “armed” against
defendants “with nothing more than conclusions.”153 The 1938 rulemakers
worried that the merits were obscured by hypertechnical rules;154 the
current Court worries that discovery costs, not ultimate merit, drive
everything. And while the drafters of the 1938 Rules believed in procedure,
even as they distrusted a focus on “ultimate truth,”155 today’s Court may
instead have less faith in procedure and more faith in judicial attempts to
discover ultimate truth.156 One can only hope that the next twenty-five
years, much like the last, will provide opportunities to assess the wisdom of
this faith and, if necessary, the courage to change course.

151 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy,
and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 897 n.45 (1999) (finding motivation for reform in fear
that business clients would resort to private adjudication because of frustration with the court
system).
152 See Subrin, supra note 23, at 955, 959 (referencing Shelton’s criticisms).
153 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). See also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559-60 (raising
the fear of coerced settlements); Fairman, supra note 22, at 1065 (observing that the common
themes animating courts when departing from notice pleading are the perceptions of “meritless
cases, voluminous discovery, victimized defendants, and crowded dockets”).
154 Resnik, supra note 60, at 540 (“What [the 1938 rulemakers] wanted—simplicity, decisions
on the merits, a reduction of reversals on appeal because of procedural mistakes—is what current
commentators want.”).
155 Id. at 541-42.
156 See Kahan et al., supra note 114, at 881-87 (arguing that, in summarily deciding the case,
“the Scott [v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2009),] majority transformed an inevitably partial view of social
reality reflected in law into a needlessly partisan one”).

